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Abstract 
The immediate post-World War Two period was marked by the consensus across the major French 
political parties that the retention of the empire was a vital component in the nation’s bid to recover 
its role in the world. This consensus extended to the French Communist Party (PCF) that had emerged 
as the largest post-war party and participated in the tripartite governments of the IVth Republic until 
May 1947. The support or lack of support that the PCF gave to independence movements in the French 
colonies has been widely studied in relation to Indochina and Algeria. However very little has been 
published on its role in the UN Trust Territory of French Cameroon, where a widely supported 
independence movement, the Union des populations du Cameroun (UPC) sought to free the territory 
from French control. The focus of this article is on the evolution of PCF policy towards the colonies and 
on the relations between the UPC and the PCF in the crucial years 1947-57 that led up to the 
independence of Cameroon, through an analysis of articles in the communist press, correspondence 
between the two ‘fraternal’ parties, and reports by French authorities. The path that led to the 
suppression of the UPC in Cameroon must be understood in the context of the role of the other major 
players in this Cold War confrontation: the USSR and the US, the UN and the international community 
more broadly, and successive French governments. 
Keywords: Cameroon; decolonisation; Françafrique; French Communist Party; Union of 
Cameroonian Peoples 
Introduction 
This year marks the seventieth anniversary of the co-incidence of the ‘official’ 
declaration of the Cold War and the burgeoning independence movements of that 
period. 1  Since decolonisation across the European empires was carried out in the 
shadow of the Cold War, all the parties in the many conflicts that ensued drew on the 
forces, allies and rationales thrown up by East-West confrontation to pursue their own 
interests and objectives. The European imperial powers would use the fight against 
communism as an alibi for opposing nationalist movements, for repressing pre- and 
post-independence forms of dissent and for tarnishing attempts at indigenous forms 
of socialism. Leaders of nationalist movements negotiated their independence not only 
in relation to the colonial power but to the range of agents that dominated the post-
World War Two years: the major players of the Eastern and Western blocs, the non-
aligned movement, and the UN. The latter was charged with particular oversight of the 
                                                        
1 Initially used in a speech by the American political advisor Bernard Baruch, the term achieved media 





Trust Territories, including Togo and Cameroon that had been consigned to French 
governance. When in 1948 the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC) was formed 
with the aim of bringing about the independence of the territory, it was therefore 
confronted not only with negotiating a rupture with a colonial power determined to 
cling on to its empire, but with an international situation that propelled it into the 
maelstrom of Cold War rivalries and alignments. 
The tortuous path of many colonies towards independence was marked by the choice 
outlined by Frantz Fanon between a gradualist process of greater autonomy granted 
by the colonial powers: ‘reform’, or a revolution to overthrow them. In Wretched of the 
Earth, Fanon notoriously advocated the necessity of violent revolution against the 
colonial power, in order to throw off the mentality and culture that had imprisoned the 
colonised. The colonised native ‘finds his freedom in and through violence’ he wrote; 
his violence responds to the violence of the coloniser, it is a dialectical necessity that 
binds the people together, delivering them from ‘despair and inaction’ (Fanon 1961, p. 
85, p. 93). In the case of the UPC, the party campaigned for reform for seven years 
within the (limited) democratic processes open to it, and relying on the country’s 
special status as a UN Trust Territory. After it was banned by the French in 1955, it was 
compelled either to abandon the radical form of independence that it advocated or to 
take up arms – it chose the latter path and there ensued a protracted military 
confrontation with French and Franco-Cameroonian forces between 1956 and 1971. A 
brutal war that put into practice the strategies developed by the French theorists of 
counter-insurgency, it resulted in military and civilian casualties in the scores of 
thousands.2 The legacy of this conflict is still relevant today to an understanding of the 
relationship between France and Cameroon, which, with France’s other former sub-
Saharan colonies, forms part of a system of political and economic interdependence 
sometimes pejoratively termed Françafrique. 
Remarkable in the immediate post-war period was the consensus across the major 
French political parties that the retention of the empire was a vital component in the 
nation’s bid to recover its role in the world and its stature as a great power. This 
consensus extended to the French Communist Party (PCF) that had emerged as the 
largest post-war party and participated in the tripartite governments of the IVth 
Republic until May 1947. 1947 was a momentous year for the French empire, marking 
the start of the First Indochina War, from December 1946, the Madagascar rebellion 
of 1947 and the crystallisation of the post-World War Two independence movement in 
French Cameroon. These movements would be the object of violent repression: in the 
case of Madagascar perhaps 100,000 were killed in a military response that was 
‘staggeringly brutal, a portent of the more enduring colonial violence to come’ writes 
Martin Thomas (2007, p. 140). The repression in Madagascar took place under 
governments supported by the communists and with communist ministers until May 
1947, when the PCF left government, not over the colonial question, however, but over 
support for a strike at the main Renault plant.3 
The support or lack of support that the PCF gave to post-war independence movements 
in the French empire has been widely studied in relation to Indochina and Algeria. 
However very little has been published on its role in the UN Trust Territory of 
                                                        
2 For an account of the counterinsurgency tactics deployed in Cameroon, see Rechniewski 2014. 
3 While not questioning the legitimacy of the military action in Madagascar, the PCF did condemn the lifting of the 
parliamentary immunity of the Madagascan deputies, who were charged, on the flimsiest evidence, with 
fomenting the rebellion (Madjarian 1977, p. 229). 
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Cameroon where a widely supported independence movement sought to free the 
territory from French control. After a brief outline of the evolution of PCF policy 
towards the French colonies, this article focuses on relations between the UPC and the 
PCF in the crucial years 1947-57 that led up to independence, through an analysis of 
articles that appeared in L’Humanité and Cahiers du communisme, correspondence 
between the two ‘fraternal’ parties, and reports by French authorities. The path that 
led to conflict in Cameroon must also be understood in the context of the role of the 
other main players in this Cold War confrontation: the USA and the USSR, the UN and 
the international community more broadly, and successive French governments. 
The Evolving Policy of the PCF towards the Colonies 
In 1920 the new party subscribed to the 21 conditions of adherence to the Third 
International; the eighth enjoined communist parties to support all movements of 
emancipation in the colonies, the expulsion of the imperialists, and agitation within 
the imperial armies. The policy was heavily influenced by Lenin’s Imperialism: the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism (1917) that associated the revolt of colonised peoples with 
that of the metropolitan working classes in the struggle against capitalism. Although 
the party created in 1924 the Intercolonial Union, which denounced colonialism with 
a vehemence unusual at the time, it was criticised by the fifth congress of the 
Comintern in June 1924 for being too slow to implement an anti-imperialist policy 
(Madjarian 1977, p. 32). However during the Rif war of 1925—the revolt of l’Emir Abd-
el-Krim against Spain, the latter supported by French troops—the PCF took exemplary 
action, organising demonstrations and strikes and encouraging French soldiers to 
fraternise with the Riffans. This was the high point in PCF support for anti-
imperialism; the Intercolonial movement would splinter into individual national 
independence movements in the following years and party policy would be largely 
determined by the immediate pressures of the international situation and defence of 
the interests of the Soviet Union, the home of Revolution. The PCF’s colonial policy 
largely followed the revirements of Stalin’s doctrine: the doctrine of ‘class against 
class,’ developed in 1926-27, that determined that communists could not support the 
demands for independence of the ‘national bourgeoisie’ in the colonised countries; and 
the abandonment of this policy in 1934-5 when, in the face of the rise of fascism in 
Europe, the Comintern acknowledged the necessity of collaboration with anti-fascist 
forces. In this context the PCF gave priority to preventing French colonies from falling 
under the sway of the fascist powers and their links to France being weakened by 
independence movements. This position was illustrated in the editorial by Paul 
Vaillant–Couturier published in L’Humanité in August 1936, condemning the 
nationalist agitation in North Africa as a tool of Hitler:  
Qui ne veut pas voir l’ampleur de l’opération hitlérienne en train de se dérouler 
contre la France, des Pyrénées aux côtes de l’Algérie, qui favorise les factieux et 
leurs machinations de guerre civile en Afrique du Nord, agit en véritable traître 
à son pays [Anyone who refuses to recognise the extent of the operation that 
Hitler is rolling out against France, from the Pyrenees to the coasts of Algeria, 
which encourages the seditious and their plotting of civil war in North Africa, is 
acting as a veritable traitor to his country] (Vaillant-Couturier 1936, p. 1).  
Summarising the PCF’s colonial policy in the interwar years, Claude Liauzu writes: ‘De 
l’activisme du Rif à la quasi-liquidation du travail colonial (…) la brutalité des 





problème de la réalité de l’anticolonialisme dans le Parti communiste [from the 
activism of the Rif to the quasi-liquidation of colonial work (…) the brutality of the 
changes of direction and the weakness of the opposition they provoke pose the problem 
of the reality of anti-colonialism in the communist party]’ (Liauzu 1982, p. 45). 
A review of the articles about Cameroon in L’Humanité in the interwar years reveals 
that the territory garnered only a few, usually brief, references each year.4 In the issue 
of 16 August 1926, for example, Lamine Senghor denounced the conditions in which 
the populations of West and Equatorial Africa lived and worked, as responsible for the 
depopulation of these territories; he cited forced labour in the forest industry in 
Cameroon as one example of this exploitation (Senghor 1926, p. 4). The period in 
which the territory received the most sustained attention in the newspaper was in the 
years 1937-39 (43 items), when the possibility had been raised by the French prime 
minister, Léon Blum, of the return of the League of Nations territories mandated to 
France, Togo and Cameroon, to Germany.5 The paper was deeply opposed to such 
restitution. In March 1939 it cited with apparent approval the lecture given by Louis 
Pasteur Vallery-Radot, comparing French colonisation favourably to that of the 
Germans. Vallery-Radot concluded: ‘les Camerounais, peuple de plus d’un million 
d’habitants, réclament le droit de rester des hommes, égaux aux autres hommes, sous 
la protection de leur deuxième patrie, la France [the Cameroonians, with a population 
of more than a million inhabitants, demand the right to remain men, equal to other 
men, under the protection of their second fatherland, France]’ (Vallery-Radot 1939, p. 
4). 
The PCF and the Post-War French Empire 
The post-war colonial policy that would be adopted by the PCF was laid out in the 
editorial published in L’Humanité on 30 August 1944, which protested the American 
proposal to establish international oversight of colonies and federated territories. This 
proposal, wrote Marcus Magnien, would be ‘contraire à la souveraineté des nations 
[contrary to national sovereignty]’: 
la France ne pourrait accepter quelque disposition que ce soit qui porterait 
atteinte à sa souveraineté de grande puissance, ni à son droit strict d’administrer 
les territoires d’outre mer dont elle a la charge dans le sens de l’émancipation 
des peuples qui les habitent, ni, surtout, à son droit de les défendre contre toute 
visée impérialiste [France could not accept any arrangement whatever that 
would threaten her sovereignty as a great power, nor her absolute right to 
administer the overseas territories entrusted to her charge, with the aim of 
emancipating their inhabitants, nor, above all, her right to defend them against 
any imperialist designs] (Magnien 1944, p. 2). 
                                                        
4 Results of a search of the digitised issues of L’Humanité on the bnf Gallica website, between 1919 and 1939. 
While not all the issues are available for every year, a large majority are, which allows an assessment of the 
tendencies in the attention paid to the territory. 
5 In discussions with Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s Minister of Economics, in Paris in August 1936, Blum indicated his 
willingness to negotiate the return of these colonies to Germany in return for a disarmament convention (Steiner 
2011, pp. 258-59).  
The only comparable period of coverage of Cameroon was in the years 1914-1916, when the paper reported 
extensively on the campaign to capture the colony from the Germans during World War One (44 items). This was 
of course before the 1920 formation of the PCF. 
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This passage offers an excellent summary of the main lines of the PCF’s post-war policy 
towards the colonies: the aim to re-establish France’s status as a great power; the 
survival of France’s civilising mission in the colonies, with emancipation, albeit 
communist emancipation, imposed from above; the justification of ‘defending’ the 
colonies from ‘imperialist designs,’ clearly designating the Americans. 
The article by Henri Lozeray in Cahiers du communisme, April 1945, drew on the 
writings of Stalin, ‘le plus grand théoricien de la question nationale [the greatest 
theoretician of the national question]’, to call into question the absolute right of 
colonised peoples to decide their own destiny. Lozeray argued that this right must be 
balanced by the global necessity of the fight against imperialism, by which once again 
is meant American imperialism. The fight against the ‘Trusts’ in which the ‘French 
nation’ is engaged will bring progress to the colonies, he wrote. Moreover, because of 
past exploitation, the colonies are ‘absolument incapables d’exister économiquement 
et par conséquent politiquement, comme nations indépendantes [totally incapable of 
surviving economically and therefore politically as independent nations]’ (Lozeray 
1945, p. 76).  
Following de Gaulle’s 1944 speech in Brazzaville promising a new status to the colonies 
and their inhabitants, France sought a form of association within which to retain 
control of her overseas possessions, while allowing a modicum of democratic 
participation. The Union française (1946-58) was the attempt to find an 
accommodation between the growing demands for reform in the colonies, and the 
economic and geopolitical interests of the metropole. Under the determined 
campaigning of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and other African leaders forced labour was 
abolished; certain rights, such as that of forming trade unions, were accorded, and 
electoral colleges set up to send representatives to the National Assembly—although 
these were elected through the profoundly undemocratic separate college system for 
Europeans and the colonised. The UN Trust territories of Togo and Cameroon were 
included in the Union as ‘associated territories’, with similar rights of representation 
as the colonies. 
The PCF broadly supported the efforts, including military, to re-establish French 
hegemony within the framework of the Union. The Programme d’action 
gouvernementale, published in the Cahiers du communisme in November 1946, 
defended the necessity of the Union in the interests of the ‘renaissance’ of France and 
also of the colonised peoples whose economic, social and political situation would 
improve through the ‘[c]onsolidation de l’union libre et confiante des populations et 
des peuples d’Outre-mer avec le peuple de France dans le cadre d’une collaboration 
fraternelle au sein de l’Union française [consolidation of the free and confident union 
of the overseas populations and peoples with the people of France in the framework of 
a fraternal collaboration within the French Union]’ (p. 1102). Raymond Barbé, who 
undertook a penetrating critique of colonialism in an article in Cahiers du 
communisme in July 1946, also did not question the ‘role civilisateur’ that France was 
called on to play but which, he argued, had been thwarted by the brutality of colonial 
exploitation (Barbé 1946, p. 572). 
Despite fine words and sentiments, it is clear that the PCF did not envisage the 
evolution of the colonies towards independence but rather a federative system that 
would see the colonies develop social and political rights within the framework of the 





backwardness of the colonies, their hope of emancipation depended on the victory of 
the French working class which, in transforming the French nation, would bring 
liberation to the colonies in the form of socialism; and the fear that behind the agitation 
for independence lay the manœuvrings of British and above all American imperial 
interests: ‘From the Communist perspective, Africans’ lack of experience would make 
them easy prey to American imperialism and international capitalism’ (Schmidt 2013, 
p. 18). While many of the African elite – the évolués – who were brought within the 
democratic process by the granting of limited voting rights and representation in the 
territorial and National Assembly, accepted gradualist evolution within the framework 
of the Union, there was also significant resistance in some colonies: the rebellion in 
Madagascar in 1947, the Algerian War 1954-62 and the little-known war in Cameroon 
between 1956 and 1971. 
Cameroon’s Path to Independence 
Cameroon, originally a Portuguese, then a Dutch, and from 1884 a German colony was 
taken over by the French in 1916. It did not have the same status as other sub-Saharan 
French colonies since it was mandated to France, along with Togo, by the League of 
Nations in 1922. The mandate saw the former German colony of Kamerun divided 
between France and Britain: four-fifths of the territory were given to the French; the 
remaining land to the west, which contained half the total population, was given to the 
British. In the interwar years, French businesses, administrators and colonists settled 
in the French section and established large cocoa, rubber, banana, and palm oil 
plantations. By 1956 there were some 17,000 white settlers in a population of some 3 
million (Joseph 1974, p. 670). Despite its status as a League of Nations mandated 
territory, it was governed in a similar way to other French colonies: native 
Cameroonians were administered from 1924 by the code de l’indigénat that led to fines 
or imprisonment of thousands each year for a broad range of ‘administrative’ offences. 
Infrastructure was built through deadly systems of forced labour that only intensified 
during World War Two, as production was ramped up to support the Free French 
forces (Madjarian 1977, p. 47). 
After the war it became a United Nations Trust Territory, with France and Britain 
entrusted to: 
promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the 
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards 
self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular 
circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes 
of the peoples concerned.6  
France, however, considered the possession of Cameroon integral to her African 
empire, including it in the various post-war forms of Francophone communities, as an 
associated territory in the Union française and as a member of the Central Africa franc 
zone (1945 to the present), ensuring close economic and political ties with France. 
Despite these efforts to integrate Cameroon into the French sphere of influence, from 
the late 1940s political activism in favour of independence developed and crystallised 
with the founding in 1947 of the Rassemblement camerounais (Racam), succeeded in 
                                                        
6 Article 76, chapter XII of the UN Charter, concerning the International Trusteeship System. The Trusteeship 
Council could receive petitions from Trust Territories and sent periodic missions to report on the progress of the 
territories. 
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1948 by the Union des Populations du Cameroun, (UPC), a title that clearly 
represented an attempt to group together under one banner the numerous and 
disparate ethnic and religious groups that existed in the country. The extent to which 
the UPC represented the population as a whole, rather than certain groups in particular 
(notably the Bamiléké), will be the subject of differing interpretations throughout its 
existence, as will the question of its allegiance to international communism. In its early 
years the UPC was stronger in the South, which was more urbanised and less 
traditional, and less dominated by the great chiefs of the North; Achille Mbembe 
argues, however, that its principal demands, for independence within ten years and 
reunification of the British and French territories, ‘exercised cultural hegemony in the 
country’ in the decade 1950-60 (Mbembe 1986, p. 45). Seven years after its founding, 
in 1955, the UPC controlled 460 village or neighbourhood committees and the French 
estimated that they had 100,000 members and sympathisers, more by far than any 
other party (Terretta 2014, p. 98), particularly on the coast and in central, south and 
west Cameroon, among the Bamiléké and Bassa. The party published the papers La 
Voix du peuple, Lumière (bi-monthly), L’Étoile (weekly) and La Vérité (for youth) and 
had active youth and women’s wings. It sought to win over opinion in Cameroon by 
democratic means until that possibility was precluded by the banning of the party in 
July 1955. 
The Origins, Ideology and Objectives of the UPC 
After a French decree of 7 August 1944 allowed the creation of trade unions in the 
colonies, several communist militants and members of the Confédération Générale du 
Travail (CGT), the PCF-affiliated trade union, set up study circles in Yaoundé and 
Douala, cercles d’études sociales et syndicales, addressing both political and 
organisational issues (Deltombe et al. 2011, pp. 40-1). Attendees included the historic 
leader of the UPC, Ruben Um Nyobé, but also others who were later to take a moderate 
or even conservative line in relation to independence. The Cameroonian workers took 
with great enthusiasm to the establishment of trade unions in the different sectors of 
the economy, which federated in December 1944 as the Union des syndicats fédérés 
du Cameroun (USSC). The USCC was spied on, its members the victims of abusive 
transfers between posts (a form of internal exile away from the centres of political 
organisation), or even dismissal (Atangana 1998, pp. 49-50) but the tight organisation 
and activism of USCC led to its quasi monopoly of trade union activity by the end of 
the 1940s. From this kernel and the Rassemblement camerounais, the UPC was born 
as a political party in April 1948; Ruben Um Nyobé became Secretary General in 
November. The UPC became the Cameroonian section of the Rassemblement 
démocratique africain (RDA) shortly after its formation, when the RDA was most 
closely aligned with the PCF, but was expelled from the RDA in 1950 because of the 
Cameroonian party’s insistence on demanding total independence from France. 
 
In his prolific writings and interventions in local and international fora, Um Nyobé 
consistently denied ideological or political affiliation with the international communist 
movement and presented the UPC as a purely anti-colonial movement of national 
liberation that crossed class lines: ‘il ne s’inspire d’aucune idéologie politique. Il ne fait 
qu’exprimer les aspirations nationales de la population (…) l’UPC n’est ni pro-
communiste, ni anti-communiste, c‘est un mouvement indépendant dirigé contre le 





aspirations of the population (…) the UPC is neither pro-communist nor anti-
communist, it is an independent movement directed against colonialism].’7 He based 
his arguments for independence on the special status of Cameroon as a Trust Territory 
and on the discourse of human rights enshrined in the 1948 declaration of the UN, the 
body charged with overseeing the governance and eventual liberation from tutelle of 
Cameroon. The UPC initially placed great hope in the capacity and willingness of the 
UN to respond to their demands: they sent delegations to address the UN assemblies 
and many thousands of petitions were submitted by UPC members and also by 
ordinary Cameroonians.8 In 1952 Ruben Um Nyobé put the UPC demands to the UN 
Assembly: a rapid move to independence and reunification of the French and British 
sectors, demands he reiterated in 1953 and 1954. By April 1955, as the repressive 
measures against them intensified, the UPC and its affiliated associations issued a 
Joint Proclamation demanding immediate independence, elections for a constituent 
assembly before the end of the year and the establishment of an African executive 
committee that would serve as a provisional government. A ‘declaration of war’ writes 
Thomas Sharp (2013, p. 84) that no doubt contributed to the banning of the party in 
July 1955, although the immediate reason given was the conflict of May 1955 between 
supporters of the UPC and the authorities. 
Relations between the UPC and PCF 
In the early years of the UPC, the late 1940s and early 1950s, the policy of the PCF 
towards the colonies reflected the co-incidence of national priorities of nation-
rebuilding with the USSR’s objective of limiting the spread of American imperialism, 
even if that meant leaving the French colonies under France’s control. The PCF and the 
CGT were, however, as we have seen, active in promoting the education and training 
of union and political figures, including Ruben Um Nyobé, who would become highly 
significant players in the political life of the country. In the crucial years 1954-55, as 
the party came under increased pressure, the UPC turned to the ‘fraternal party’ for 
support in its confrontation with the French authorities and its attempt to gain wider 
international standing. An undated letter written by the comité directeur of the UPC 
in reply to the invitation to attend the XIIIth congress of the PCF, held at Ivry-sur-
Seine in June 1954, lists the support that the French party had given to their struggle, 
a list whose ‘énumération irait à l’infini [enumeration would stretch to infinity]’. 9 The 
letter lists six initiatives undertaken or pursued by the French Communist Party and 
its deputies in the National Assembly: 
• the support of Communist deputies for the abolition of forced labour and the 
code de l’indigénat; 
• their sponsorship of a law to challenge the colonialist notion that African lands 
are ‘terres vacantes et sans maîtres [vacant lands without owners]’;  
• their unstinting opposition to the attempt by the colonialists – under the 
leadership of Durand-Reville10 – to reintroduce forced labour. The struggle of 
                                                        
7 Um Nyobé, ‘Ce que veut le peuple camerounais’, memoir and documents submitted to the Fourth Commission of 
the UN General Assembly, 17-18 December 1952. Quoted in Atangana 1998, p. 63. 
8 The 1955 UN mission to French Cameroon estimated that it received 40,000 communications, 90% from UPC 
sources. During 1954-55 the Trusteeship Council received approx 15,000 petitions , most of them from the UPC or 
its affiliates. In 1956 it received 33,026, 95% from UPC sources. Quoted in Le Vine 1964, p. 284. 
9 ‘Adresse du comité directeur de l’Union des Populations du Cameroun au XIIIe congrès du parti communiste 
français’, nd., Archives Nationales d’Outremer, Aix-en Provence, Boîte FM 1 aff/pol/3335. 
10 Luc Durand-Reville represented the Gabon and led the settler reaction to the attempt to legislate a code de 
travail for the Union. He proposed that the regulation of work be largely left to the individual colonies since it was 
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the Indigenous workers found ‘un appui total [total support]’ on the part of the 
Communist deputies in all the French assemblies; 
• their support for the revision of the salaries of Indigenous public servants so 
that they would equal those of the French; 
• wide-ranging support for the UPC in its interventions at the UN (in obtaining 
American visas for the UPC representatives for example) and in protesting the 
violent repression of their movement at Foumban and elsewhere. 
Finally the letter applauds the PCF’s condemnation of the ‘sale guerre’ in Indochina, 
despite suffering reprisals from the ‘gouvernements colonialistes qui se succèdent en 
France depuis 1947 [colonialist governments who have succeeded each other in France 
since 1947]’, the year in which the PCF ministers were excluded from government.  
Declaring the PCF ‘le seul parti politique de France qui reconnait sans équivoque le 
doir (sic) des Peuples coloniaux à disposer d’eux-mêmes [the only political party in 
France which recognises unequivocally the right of colonial Peoples to self-
determination]’, the letter nevertheless declares that their attendance at the Congress 
is intended ‘ni pour donner son adhésion au Parti communiste, ni pour recevoir les 
consignes ou mots d’ordre comme peuvent le prétendre les personnes mal 
intentionnées [neither to pledge loyalty to the communist party nor to receive 
instructions or watchwords as ill-disposed people may claim]’. Thomas Sharp 
describes the relationship of the UPC with the PCF as one of ‘pragmatic engagement’ 
that offered the party access to a metropolitan and international audience (Sharp 2013, 
p. 82).  
L’Humanité drew attention to the situation in Cameroon with a regular column from 
1953 entitled ‘Que se passe-t-il au Cameroun?’ (Michel 1999, p. 234). It denounced 
throughout June 1955 the ferocity of the repression that followed the events of May 
1955 and the indiscriminate imprisonment of activists. The latter were in many cases 
defended by local and French communist lawyers who reported to the paper on the 
obstacles that were placed in their path, such as being refused permission to view their 
clients’ dossiers or to participate in the police interviews. 11 Ultimately, however, UPC 
links with the PCF were fraught with ambiguity and disappointment. Correspondence 
between the UPC and Louis Odru12 (communist member of the Assembly of the Union 
Française) in 1955-56 reveals the growing disillusionment of the UPC with the PCF.13 
In the first letter in the series dated 30 March 1955, UPC president Félix Moumié 
thanks Odru for the intervention in the National Assembly of Charles Benoist, PCF 
deputy for Seine-et-Oise, denouncing the repression of the UPC. Moumié declares 
‘notre indéfectible attachement à la cause de votre parti [our unwavering attachment 
to the cause of your party]’. In a letter to Moumié dated 2 May 1955, Odru complains, 
however, that the UPC had given incorrect information about events in Bafoussam and 
Meaganga, information that had been published in L’Humanité.14  
                                                        
‘absurd’ to apply the same regulations to white settlers and ‘the still savage tribes of the most backward countries 
of the equatorial forest’. Quoted in Cooper 1996, pp. 292-93. 
11 ‘La terreur s’accentue au Cameroun’, L’Humanité, 25 September 1955. 
12 Member of the Colonial Section of the PCF from 1949, he travelled several times to French Africa. 
13 Félix Moumié, président de l’UPC, à Louis Odru, conseiller à l’Assemblée de l’Union française. 30 March 1955. 
Archives du PCF, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Boîte 261 J732/Afr Noire 32.  
14 Louis Odru à Félix Moumié. 2 May 1955. Archives PCF, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Boîte 





In the French legislative elections of 2 January 1956, the communists re-emerged as 
the largest party. Although it did not enter into a coalition, the PCF at first supported 
the government of Guy Mollet (SFIO). In a letter dated 25 January 1956, the UPC 
political bureau issued a ‘declaration’ in the aftermath of the elections, complaining 
that since the elections there has been no reference to the ‘problème kamerunais’.15 Is 
that, the letter asks rhetorically, because ‘le sang ne coule pas? [no blood is flowing?].’ 
The declaration expresses the fear that the PCF is too close to the socialists, who have 
been responsible for the ‘divers massacres dans leur pays dans le but d’étouffer leurs 
aspirations [various massacres in their country with the aim of smothering their 
aspirations]’. It calls on the PCF to recognise the acuteness of the danger that the UPC 
faces, in light of the crimes committed overseas by successive French governments 
since 1947. 16  But it nevertheless affirms the UPC’s desire to negotiate a peaceful 
agreement with France. 
In its reply dated 4 April 1956 (unsigned), the PCF cites the actions its deputies have 
taken in defence of the UPC: demands for a parliamentary inquiry into the events of 
May 1955 (rejected); for the abrogation of the dissolution of the party; and amnesty for 
the prisoners arrested in May 1955.17 It is noteworthy, however, that not only is no 
mention made of the UPC’s key demand for independence but the PCF salutes the 
proposed loi-cadre (passed in June 1956) as a sign of progress.18 In the final letter in 
the series dated 15 May, the UPC, replying to the April letter and responding no doubt 
to news of the PCF’s vote in favour of the Special Powers Act that gave the army 
extensive powers in Algeria (March 1956), protests that it is kept in ignorance of the 
initiatives taken by the PCF on its behalf.19 It accuses the party of having the same 
prejudices as the colonialists ‘et de se compromettre avec Guy Mollet en vue de former 
un Front populaire [and of compromising with Guy Mollet with the aim of forming a 
Popular Front]’. 
Forced to pursue their struggle clandestinely, UPC leaders moved to British Cameroon 
or went into the forests; after some hesitation and internal discussion and dissension, 
from December 1956 they began to organise guerrilla activity. As Richard Joseph 
notes, there was a gap of nineteen months between the banning of the party and the 
resort to guerrilla activity, a period during which the party attempted to regain its right 
to participate in the democratic process (Joseph 1986, p. 358). The decision to resort 
to guerrilla activity must be understood in the light of the ongoing repression and the 
UPC leaders increasing disillusionment with the likelihood of external intervention, 
whether from the UN, from the broader international community or from the left in 
France, including the PCF. The correspondence between the PCF and the UPC 
analysed above relates precisely to this period. As Sharp shows, the UPC sought in 
those nineteenth months to raise international attention through a variety of political 
channels – only when this tactic failed did they resort to violence, to try to impose a 
                                                        
15 In 1955 the political bureau consisted of Um Nyobé General Secretary, Félix Moumié President, Abel Kingué 
and Ernest Ouandié Vice-Presidents. Déclaration du Bureau politique de l’UPC au PCF. 25 January 1956. Archives 
PCF, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Boîte 261 J732/Afr Noire 32. 
16 ‘Les gouvernements qui se sont succédés depuis 1947 ont tellement commis de crimes outremer qu’il est temps 
pour le prochain gouvernement de saisir l’acuité d’un tel danger et lui trouver le remède qui s’impose.’ 
17 Parti communiste français à l’UPC. Unsigned. 4 April 1956. By now the UPC was operating clandestinely. 
Archives PCF, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Boîte 261 J732/Afr Noire 32. 
18 According to the loi-cadre the French government retained control over foreign affairs, the police, defence, 
customs, financial and monetary affairs and higher education. 
19 The letter, with the UPC en tête, is neither addressed nor signed, but was clearly written in response to the letter 
of 4 April. Archives PCF, Archives départementales de la Seine-Saint-Denis, Boîte 261 J732/Afr Noire 32. 
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boycott of elections from which they were excluded (2013, p. 77). Indeed, until 
November 1958, Sharp argues, the sporadic use of violence was ‘significantly 
determined by developments within the United Nations’ (p. 97). In the crucial year 
1958, as France manoeuvred towards granting Cameroon an independence that would 
keep the nation within the francosphere, the PCF was, perhaps inevitably, increasingly 
focused on the situation in Algeria, the repercussions of which on life and politics in 
France were so dramatic and immediate. The Senegalese nationalist intellectual 
Amady Aly Dieng, briefly member of the PCF in 1958-59, criticised the ‘total silence on 
African problems’ in the pages of L’Humanité (Dieng 2011, p. 106). When Raymond 
Barbé, formerly responsible for the Colonial Section of the PCF, visited Cameroon in 
mid-May 1958, he met Ahidjo and the moderate nationalist Soppo Priso, but no 
representative of the UPC that of course was now a clandestine movement (Deltombe 
et al 2011, p. 334). 
The Role of the UN 
The UN periodically sent missions to Cameroon to report on the progress being made 
towards self-government and the general conditions in the country. France sought to 
ensure that the most favourable impression would be made by closely controlling the 
conditions in which the visits took place, including ensuring that political prisoners 
were ‘provisionally removed’ from the capital (Deltombe et al 2011, p. 330). The 
members of the mission reflected the make-up of the Conseil de tutelle: half were 
representatives of the countries responsible for the territories sous tutelle; half were 
appointed or elected by the General Assembly.20 Western dominance of the UN in the 
1950s thus ensured that the majority would be sympathetic to French arguments and 
Cold War loyalties.  
The demands for independence put forward by Ruben Um Nyobé at the UN in 1952, 
1953 and 1954 were countered by the French who ensured that local representatives 
loyal to their rule also spoke at the Assembly, and in public fora and private lobbying 
insisted that the UPC was the creation of the external agitators of international 
communism. Thus in 1952, at the IVth Commission, the French delegation in New York 
sent a coded telegram to the High Commission in Cameroon: 
Pour empêcher l’adoption d’une résolution engageant l’avenir, il reste que j’ai dû, 
discrètement en public et avec beaucoup plus d’insistance dans les conversations 
privées, affirmer le caractère pro-communiste de l’UPC [To prevent the adoption of a 
resolution that might be binding on the future, I have had, discretely in public and with 
much greater insistence in private conversations, to declare the pro-communist 
character of the UPC] (quoted in Um Nyobé 1984, p. 57). 
The official French response of 6 December 1955 to the petitions received by the UN 
concerning the events of May 1955, justified banning the UPC since it was a 
‘totalitarian’ and ‘xenophobic’ party, a ‘mouvement révolutionnaire d’un type devenu 
classique [revolutionary movement of a classic kind]’. 21  The success of France’s 
characterisation of the UPC can be seen in the report of the UN Mission that, after 
visiting Cameroon in March 1956, approved the banning of the UPC and its youth and 
women’s wings since their members ‘tentent de répandre une doctrine inspirée du 
                                                        
20 http://www.un.org/fr/documents/charter/chap13.shtml. 
21 Pétitions concernant le Cameroun sous Administration française. Observations du Gouvernement français en 





communisme [attempt to spread a doctrine inspired by communism]’.22 Reflecting on 
the reasons for the failure of the UPC to win power, Pierre Messmer, who was High 
Commissioner of Cameroon from April 1956 until the end of January 1958, notes the 
lack of external political or material support it received and the hostility of the UN 
towards its demands: ‘L’ONU (…) n’a jamais réservé bon accueil aux pétitionnaires 
upécistes, très marqués par leur adhésion au communisme, en des temps de guerre 
froide [The UN (…) never gave a good reception to the UPC petitioners, strongly 
characterised by their adherence to communism, in the Cold War period]’ (Messmer 
1998, p. 126). Messmer does not add that it was the French who ensured that the UPC 
would be characterised in this way.  
The French press, from the right-wing papers to Combat on the left, writes Marc 
Michel, echoed the French government perspective, presenting the UPC “à travers les 
lunettes de l’anti-communisme [through anti-communist lenses].” 23  The 
characterisation of the UPC promoted by the French authorities was widely adopted 
by the international press too. Even newspapers that might be considered sympathetic 
to the cause of decolonisation, such as the Manchester Guardian in the UK, tended to 
characterise the UPC as ‘communist-inspired’ or ‘communist-affiliated’.24  
The Cold War was a crucial factor in explaining the latitude accorded to France by the 
Western bloc powers, West and Central Africa having been in effect ceded to French 
influence to counter the communist threat. The overall tendency of US policy in the 
post-war period, notes Peter Schraeder, was to see Africa as ‘a special area of influence 
and responsibility of the former European colonial powers’ in a context where US 
policy-makers tended ‘to view Africa from an East-West perspective’ (Schraeder 1994, 
p. 14, p. 15). In his report to the UN Trustee Council in February 1955, the American 
representative, Mason Sears, praised France’s administration of the colony and 
expressed the hope that, in its evolution towards ‘autonomy’ (he did not use the term 
‘independence’), the Cameroonians would retain ‘les liens les plus étroits [the closest 
of ties]’ with France (‘Le Conseil de tutelle’, 1955). The Western bloc countries 
consistently voted to refuse UPC demands at the UN, turned a blind eye to French 
military intervention, and ignored the fact that Trustees did not have the right to ban 
political parties.  
In the context of the Cold War, the accusation of communist affiliation was sufficient 
to distance even some of the non-aligned countries from supporting the demands of a 
movement that had been tainted in this way at the UN (Deltombe et al. 2011, p. 333). 
On 9 March 1959, in the first round of voting at the UN on the terms of Cameroon’s 
independence, which would be granted with neither new elections nor a constitution 
in place, most of the countries associated with the Bandung movement abstained 
rather than voting against. Even the communist bloc abstained in the final vote on 10 
March, reflecting the Soviet Union’s preoccupation with preventing the new African 
nations from falling into the American camp. The French were thus able to ensure that 
independence was granted on terms favourable to them, with a president whose rise to 
power they had overseen, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and with the often secret technical, 
military and economic agreements in place that protected French geopolitical and 
                                                        
22 ‘Un rapport de l’ONU sur le Cameroun’, Le Monde, 9 March 1956. 
23 Marc Michel, ‘Une Décolonisation confisquée? Perspectives sur la décolonisation du Cameroun sous tutelle de 
la France 1955-1960,’ Revue française d’histoire d’outre-mer 86, no. 324-25 (1999), 233. 
24 See for example the description of the clashes in Douala in May 1955 as ‘Communist-incited,’ in ‘Riots in 
French Cameroons,’ Manchester Guardian, 28 May 1955, p. 11. The newpaper is drawing on a Reuter report. 
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economic interests. On independence, only the governments of Ghana, Guinea and 
China explicitly recognised the UPC as the legitimate government of Cameroon.25 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article has not been to assess whether the UPC was indeed a communist 
front, as the French authorities alleged, but to explore how the major players in the 
conflict around decolonisation were able to draw on the forces, allies and rationales 
thrown up by East-West confrontation. Some did so with greater success than others. 
Deltombe et al conclude that ‘l’instrumentalisation des clivages de la guerre froide 
profite davantage à la France qu’à l’UPC [the instrumentalisation of Cold War divisions 
is more advantageous to France than to the UPC] (Deltombe et al. 2011, p. 334). While 
a range of political and military factors, impossible to explore here, contributed to the 
UPC’s failure to impose its policies on the form of independence, the movement was 
the victim, too, of the particular conjuncture of interests of the metropolitan and 
international communist movement. 
Whereas the UPC hoped and expected that the PCF would support their demands, the 
French party was preoccupied with the recovery of French status, and, under the sway 
of the USSR’s geopolitical interests, with trying to limit the spread of American 
‘imperialism’. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the policy of the URSS towards 
nationalist movements was underpinned by Stalin’s theory that the colonies had no 
potential for socialist revolution; their emancipation would follow only in the wake of 
the action of the proletariat in the imperial countries; the Kremlin’s attitude towards 
the African nationalist leaders, dismissed as belonging to the ‘national bourgeoisie’, 
was ‘ideological, dogmatic and contemptuous’ (Bartenev 2007, p. 65). These positions 
were reflected in the PCF’s attitude towards anti-colonial struggle in Cameroon: it 
denounced the violence of the repression of the UPC and yet did not envisage 
independence for the colony, for this would have run counter to both its own national 
and Soviet policy and interests. 
In 1955-56 a new strategy was developed under Khruschev: with the apparent 
stabilisation of the geopolitical order on the European continent, the growing 
movement for decolonisation created new opportunities for the superpowers to seek 
to extend their global influence. The Bandung conference of 1955 showed the Soviet 
leadership that it risked falling behind in the race to influence the new bloc of non-
aligned nations and the countries that were moving towards independence. They did 
not, however, want to provoke the West and risk the stabilisation in Europe by direct 
intervention. Rather, ‘il semblait plus rationnel aux yeux de Khrouchtchev de gagner 
les sympathies des régimes existants, d’établir avec eux des relations régulières et de 
leur montrer comment l’amitié avec la patrie du socialisme pourrait faciliter leur 
développement en tant que pays indépendants [it seemed more rational in Khruschev’s 
eyes to win the sympathy of existing regimes, to establish normal relations with them 
and to show them how friendship with the home of socialism could facilitate their 
development as independent countries]’ (Bartenev 2007, p. 67). We can surely see in 
this policy the reasons for the abstention of the socialist bloc in the vote on Cameroon’s 
independence at the UN in 1959, and for the presence of the Soviet Deputy Minister 
for Foreign Affairs, Nikolai Firoubine, at the independence ceremony on 1 January 
                                                        
25 China trained UPC guerrilla fighters in Ghana until the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966 (Shinn and Eisenman 





1960 (Blanchet 1960, p. 5). The Soviet Union recognised Ahidjo’s regime in March 1964 
and invited Ahidjo on an official visit soon after. 
Félix Moumié, who had succeeded Um Nyobé after the latter was killed in September 
1958, intervened in many anti-colonialist international fora and campaigned for 
money and support, including from Russia and China, until his assassination by 
French secret agent William Bechtel in Geneva in November 1960. Having lost some 
of its most brilliant leaders, the nomadic UPC leadership in exile was increasingly beset 
by internal divisions and personal rivalries. At odds amongst themselves in divisions 
fostered by the Sino-Soviet split,26 the exiled leaders became an increasing burden and 
embarrassment to their hosts, while the poorly equipped guerrilla fighters within the 
country were gradually reduced to isolated bands at the mercy of hunger and betrayal. 
Ahmadou Ahidjo (1960-1982), relying on the political and military support of France 
to combat the rebels, was able to set up an authoritarian regime in the name of the fight 
against communist subversion. The Republic of Cameroon, reunited with Southern 
Cameroon in 1961, remains today the ‘pillar’ of Françafrique, the nation with which 
France has the ‘best relations’, with Ahidjo’s successor Paul Biya (1982-present) as its 
elder statesman.27 
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